Wireless environments such as GSM, 3G, and 4G are more and more popular. Consequently, communications in such networks need to be guarded. It is necessary to have a secure mutual authentication scheme to defend transactions between user and service provider against illegitimate adversaries. Especially, users are those vulnerable to attacks and there are many authentication schemes with smart-card proposed to protect them. Recently, Yung-Cheng Lee has suggested a dynamic identity based user authentication scheme to resist smart-card-theft attack. Nevertheless, he assumed that smart-card is tamperproof. In our opinion, this is not appropriate because Kocher and Messerges pointed that smart-card's confidential information could be extracted by physically monitoring its power consumption. Therefore, design of Yung-Cheng Lee cannot withstand this kind of attack. In addition, anyone who is a legal member can masquerade server or other legal users in his scheme. Moreover, legitimacy verification only starting from server side truly makes Lee's scheme be impractical. In this paper, we present an improvement to his scheme to isolate such problems.
Introduction
In network environments, remote authentication schemes play an important role in communicating between partners because it keeps faith and security. Schemes not only must prevent legal users and servers from attacks of illegitimate adversaries, but they also defend legal partners against impersonating to cheat each other.
There are many methods of satisfying above requirements. And one of the approaches many schemes have used is password authentication which has many advantages such as simplicity, efficiency, and convenience. Nonetheless, many schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] based on password apply static identity, which is easy to leaking information to attackers. One solution to identity theft is making it change for each login. Later, a number of paper [6, 7, 20, 8, 16] have put forward many ideas to protect user anonymity by using random value or time-stamp to vary user identity for each session. However, these schemes issue a smart-card for each user and assume that the contents of smart-card cannot be revealed. This is not practical because users can lost or be stolen smart-card. So, when attackers have smart-card, they completely have capability to impersonate users.
In 2004, Das et al proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [10] . Their scheme has three main advantages. Firstly, it allows users to change password freely. Moreover, it does not maintain a verification table which is used to check login message. Finally, the scheme's security is based on secure one-way hash function.
Recently, Yung-Cheng Lee proposed a new dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme to resist smart-card-theft attack [13] and pointed out that scheme of Das et al is vulnerable to guessing and impersonation attacks. He claimed that his scheme enhanced the security because of using dynamic identity feature. Furthermore, he also stated that his scheme can completely resist smart-card-theft attack. In this paper, we prove that his scheme cannot suffer from smart-card-theft attack. Furthermore, it also cannot withstand masquerading attack. Finally, we see that his scheme does not provide mutual authentication and session-key exchange phase. Eventually, we propose an improved version of Lee' scheme in order to recover all problem mentioned.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 quickly reviews Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme and discusses its weaknesses. Then, our proposed scheme is presented in section 3, while section 4 discusses the security and efficiency of the proposed scheme. Our conclusions are presented in section 5.
Review and Cryptanalysis of Yung-Cheng Lee's Scheme
In this section, we review Lee's new dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme to resist smart-card-theft attack [9] and show that his scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack, smart-card-theft attack. Furthermore, it does not provide mutual authentication.
Review of Yung-Cheng Lee's Scheme
In this subsection, we review Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme. Their scheme includes three phases: registration, authentication and password update phases. Some important notations in this scheme are listed as follow:
The remote server that users log in. 
Registration Phase
When U i wants to access resource of S, he or she has to submit his or her PW i to server through a secure channel. Then, S performs the following steps. Figure 1 illustrates the steps of the registration phase.
-S installs {h(.), N i , h(x)} into SC and issues it to U i through a secure channel.
In registration phase, we see that user freely chooses PW i . However, his scheme does not apply identity to participate into registration process. Furthermore, sharing a common h(x) for every member makes this phase be weak because they can exploit to impersonate to cheat each other. To overcome these weak points, we use identity, supply a random value e to make different for each time of registering and do not share the secret key h(x) for all users. 
Login Phase
After receiving secret information from S, U i can use SC when he or she wants to login to S.
-U i inserts SC into card-reader of another terminal. Then he or she keys PW i .
-SC generates a random value R and computes
The U i sends the login message to S through common channel.
In login phase, we see that user generates a random value R to make login message be renewed for each login. However, this is also the drawback because R does not participate to challenge S. In the next phase, we see that S does not need to know what R is, yet S still authenticates U i . So, we will fix this weak point of his phase.
Verification Phase
After receiving the login request sent from U i , S performs the following tasks to authenticate the user's login request. Figure 2 illustrates the steps of login and verification phase.
-On receiving the login request {DID i , C i , T} from U i , S checks T to determine its validity. If T is within an expected time interval, S accepts the login request; otherwise, it terminates the request.
and checks if the received C i is equal to C ′ i . If this condition holds, S accepts the login request; otherwise, it terminates the session. In verification phase, we see that S does not generate any random value to re-challenge U i . Furthermore, S also does not prove its validity to U i . So, S and U i cannot know whether server and user communicating are legal or not. At this point we use user three-way challenge-response handshake technique to recover. With that technique, S can know user's legitimation. In this phase, U i can change his or her password anytime when he or she wants. Figure 3 illustrates the steps of the password change phase.
-U i inserts SC into card-reader and inputs PW i .
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-SC replaces N i with N inew . So, user can log into the system by using PW inew In password update phase, we see that only legal users can change password because this proceduce needs PW i of users. In our scheme, we also inherit this idea basically.
Cryptanalysis of Yung-Cheng Lee's Scheme
In this subsection, we present our results on Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme. We will show that his scheme is vulnerable
to impersonation and smart-card-theft attacks. Besides, his scheme needs to be supplied mutual authentication and session-key exchange phases.
Impersonation Attack
In Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme, we see that anyone being a valid member can know h(x). Hence, with h(x), valid users can impersonate other users even the server.
-Firstly, another legal user A can perform following steps to be a valid server.
Certainly, A does not have to do this. Clearly, A has ability to be a valid server. -Secondly, another legal user A can perform following steps to be another valid user.
, where T * is the current timestamp. -Finally, A sends {DID i , C * i , T * } to server S. Clearly, this is a completely valid login message.
Smart-card-theft Attack
In Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme, we see that losing smartcard is very dangerous because it contains {h(.), N i , h(x)}. If anyone being a valid member picks smart-card, attacker A easily extracts h(PW i ) by performing N i ⊕ h(x). Next, A can perform some steps to impersonate victim.
-A generates a random value R * and computes the dynamic DID i by:
, where PW i and N i belongs to victim.
this is the valid login message.
Mutual Authentication & Session Key Agreement Phases
In Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme, we see that only server can verify user's validity. This is not fair because user can communicate with another illegal server. So, we need server proves its validity to user. Furthermore, after successfully authenticating, transmitting data between server and user is necessary. Therefore, we need to supply a sub-step of sharing a common session-key.
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose an improved version of Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme. Our scheme removes the security problems depicted in the previous sections. Our scheme not only inherits the advantages of his scheme, it also enhances the security. Before coming to each phase, we will present general ideas in our scheme more detailed. In registration phase, our main goal is obtaining h(ID i ⊕ h(x e)). Random value e assists to withstand re-registration of attackers, with the same identity but various authentication keys at different time. In login and authentication phases, we use two random values R U and R S for user and server for challenging each other. Besides, we employ three-way challenge-response handshake technique to resist replay or impersonation attacks instead of using timestamp. And it is very important to have the same session-key for user and server after verification step.
Our scheme is also divided into the four phases of registration, login, mutual authentication and password change phases. Some important notations in our scheme are listed as follow:
The nonce chosen by user in registration phase.
-S: The remote server that users log in. -x: The secret key of the remote server. 
Registration Phase
Before we present this phase, we enumerate three requirements for a registration phase: secrecy for information transmitted between user and server, the true password of user must not be leaked to anyone even the server, and difference between secret keys provided for each time of registration by server. Easily, we see that Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme achieved the first requirement but not the last. So, we cover these points to have a good registration phase. When U i wants to register to S, he or she has to submit his or her ID i , h(PW i N). After receiving {ID i , h(PW i N)} from user via a secure channel, S performs following steps. Figure 4 illustrates the steps of the registration phase.
1.Generating a random value e. 
2.Computing
A i = h(ID i h(PW i N)) ⊕ h(x e). 3.Computing L i = h(ID i h(PW i N) h(x e)). 4.S sends SC containing {A i , L i , e,i = ID i ⊕ R U . 3.Computing B i = h(x e) ⊕ R U and C i = h(ID i R U h(x e)). 4.Finally, U i sends {CID i , B i , C i , e} to S.
Mutual Authentication And Session Key Agreement Phase
Likewise, we also list three requirements helping authentication be more security: User must employ a random value to challenge server. Server must use a random value to re-challenge user. User and server share a secret session-key. In Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme, only user use a random value to make login-message be dynamic but not to challenge server and server also do not re-challenge user. Besides, no session-key is generated after authenticating successfully. Our phase will fix these weak points.
In this section, S receives the login request message (CID i , B i , C i , e) from U i in the login phase and performs some following steps. Figure 5 illustrates the steps that S authenticates U i .
1.Computing R
If this is a valid identity, S continues going to next step. Otherwise, S rejects the login message.
3.S checks whether C i is equal to h(ID i R *

U h(x e)).
If this condition is true, S goes to next step. Otherwise, S terminates the session. 
4.Generating R S and computing
K = h(ID i R * U ) ⊕ R S , V = h(R S h(x e)
Password Update Phase
When U i wants to change PW i . He or she can perform following steps:
-Insert SC into card-reader, inputs ID i , PW i and choose a new password PW inew .
-SC computes h(x e) = h(ID i h(PW i N)) ⊕ A i and L * i = h(ID i h(PW i N) h(x e)
). -SC checks whether L i is equal to L * i . If this condition is false, SC terminates this phase. Otherwise, it goes to next step.
-SC computes A inew = h(x e) ⊕ h(ID i h(PW inew N)) and L inew = h(ID i h(PW inew N) h(x e)
). 
Security and Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we review our scheme and analyze it on two aspects: security and efficiency. Our scheme includes four phases, registration, login, authentication and sessionkey agreement, and password change phases. Firstly, we summarize all phases of our scheme.
-Registration phase: U i sends {ID
i , h(PW i N)}. S returns SC containing {A i , L i , e,
h(.)}, where A i = h(ID i h(PW i N)) ⊕ h(x e), L i = h(ID i h(PW i N) h(x e)
) and e is chosen by S. U i receives SC and inputs N into it. 
-Login phase: U i inserts SC, ID i and PW i . Then, SC extracts h(x e) by performing A i ⊕ h(ID i h(PW i N)). SC verifies whether L i is equal to h(ID i h(PW i N) h(x e)
Security Analysis
In this section, we apply BAN logic, the tool for formally analyzing authentication schemes. BAN-logic uses three objects: principals, encryption keys, and formulas (also called statements for identifying message with statement). Similarly to Burrow [21] , we let symbols P and Q be principals, X and Y range over statements, and K represent the cryptographic key. We only use some notations used in BAN-logic for our demonstration.
-P |≡ X: P believes X (central construct).
-P ⊳ X: P received a message including X.
-P |∼ X: P once said X.
-P ⇒ X: P has jurisdiction over X. (Used when principal has delegated authority over some statement). -#(X): X is fresh, that is, no principal sent X in a message before the current run of the protocol.
-P K ↔ Q: P and Q communicate using shared K. Moreover, K will never be discovered by any principal except P and Q, or a principal trusted by either P or Q. Besides, we present some main logical BAN-logics postulates for proving our scheme. 
P|≡X,P|≡Y P|≡(X,Y)
All authentication schemes need achieving main eight goals. We use U and S represent for user and server in scheme.
Now we use the BAN-logic to show proposed scheme can obtain mutually authentication with dynamic identity. Furthermore, our scheme can exchange a common session key SK 1.We idealize our scheme.
We write the assumptions about the initial state.
-
We analyze our schemes idealized form based on the BANlogic rules and the assumptions.
-Because U registers ID with S, we have the first goal U |≡ U ID ↔ S. -Using A 6 and the message C i , we apply the message-meaning rule to derive S |≡ U |∼ <R U ,
↔ S> (1) -Using A 8 , we apply freshness rule to infer S |≡
↔ S> (2) -Using (1) and (2), we apply nonce -verification
↔ S> (3) -Using (3), we apply believe rule to derive S |≡ U |≡ U ID ↔ S (G 4 ) -Using G 4 and A 4 , we apply jurisdiction rule to infer S |≡ U ID ↔ S (G 3 ) -Using A 2 and K, we apply the message-meaning rule to derive U |≡ S |∼ <R S , R U , U ID ↔ S> (4) -Using (4) and A 7 , we apply freshness rule to derive (4) and (5), we apply nonce -verification rule to derive U |≡ S |≡ <R S , R U , U ID ↔ S> (6) -Using (6), we apply believe rule to derive U |≡ S |≡ U ID ↔ S (G 2 ) 4.With goal 1, 2, 3 and 4, we achieve that both S and U believe the other believes the identity. That is, U and S mutually authenticate with dynamic identity. Now we prove U and S can exchange SK.
-Using V and A 2 , we apply the message-meaning
↔ S> (7) -Using A 7 and V, we apply freshness rule to derive
↔ S> (8) -Using (7) and (8), we apply nonce -verification
↔ S> (9) -Using (9), we apply believe rule to derive U |≡ S |≡ S SK ↔ U (G 6 ) -Using A 3 and G 6 , we apply jurisdiction rule to obtain U |≡ U SK ↔ S (G 5 ) -Using M and A 6 , we apply the message-meaning rule to derive S |≡ U |∼ <R U , R S > (10) -Using M and A 8 , we apply freshness rule to derive S |≡ #<R U , R S > (11) -Using (10) and (11), we apply the nonceverification rule to derive S |≡ U |≡ <R U , R S > (12) -Using (12) and A 6 , we apply believe rule to infer S (12) and A 5 , we apply message-meaning rule to infer S |≡ <R U , R S > (13) -Using (13), we apply believe rule to derive S |≡ S SK ↔ U (G 7 ) 5.With goal 5, 6, 7 and 8, we achieve both S and U believe the other believes SK is shared between them.
Other Discussions
In this subsection, we present security analyses of our scheme and show that proposed scheme can withstand many kinds of attacks. Assuming that wireless communication is insecure and that there exists an attacker. He or she has capability to intercept all messages transmitted between server and user. Besides, we assume that the attacker can obtain or steal information of legal user's smart-card.
Replay Attack
The replay attack is replaying the same message of the receiver or the sender again. We use nonce and three-way challenge-response handshake technique instead of timestamp to withstand replay attacks. For example, an attacker A re-uses {CID i , B i , C i , e} to re-send to S. When S sends {K, V} back to A, A is not capable of computing M because A has no information about R U and R S . So, A cannot replay with {CID i , B i , C i , e}. Now, if A re-uses {K, V} of server S, user will recognize this is a replay message because verification of V does not hold. It is said that our scheme can resist replay attack.
Impersonation Attack
In our scheme, we use use nonce and three-way challenge-response handshake technique. Therefore, it is difficult for attackers to impersonate user or server. For example, if attacker A wants to fake legal user, A has to compute M to re-send to S. So, it is impossible for A to perform that task because A has no idea about R U and R S . Now, if A wants to fake legal S, A must have information about x of server and random value R U of user. Clearly, this is impossible mission. It is said that our scheme can withstand impersonation completely.
Stolen Verifier Attack
Because S does not store any password verification table, the proposed scheme can withstand stolen-verifier attacks. In our scheme, S generates a random value e for each user. Consequently, when authenticating with S, U i only needs to send e to S and S uses x to re-construct h(x e) of that user. So, S does not need to keep U i 's password in the storage space when a new user is participated into our system. 
Stolen Informaton from
Known-key Attack
The known-key security means that compromise of a past session-key cannot derive any further session-key. In our scheme, SK is associated with two random values R U , R S and h(x e), which are unknown to the adversary. Even though the past SK is disclosed, the attacker cannot derive R U , R S and h(x e) based on the security of one-way hash function and random values. Thus, the attacker can not obtain any further session-key.
Mutual Authentication
In our scheme, both user and server generate random values to challenge each other. S only accepts U i when C i is equal to h(ID i R * U h(x e)) and M is equal to h(R * U R S ). U i only accepts S when V is equal to h(R * S h(x e)). In other words, user and server must computes random values to prove their validity. Clearly, our scheme provides mutual authentication.
Session-key Agreement
In our scheme, after finishing mutual authentication successfully, both user and server share common SK to encrypt messages later. So, our scheme not only satisfies mutual authentication but also provides session-key to partners.
Our scheme is a revised version of Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme, so it can also resist password guessing attack and provide user anonymity.
Efficiency Analysis
To compare efficiency between our scheme and the Yung-Cheng Lee's, we reuse approach used in his scheme to analyze computational complexity. That is, we calculate the number of one-way hash function execution. Let T h be the time to compute one-way hash function. In addition, similarly to Lee's scheme, we also ignore exclusive-or(⊕) and concatenation operations( ) because they requires very few computations.
In table 1, there are our scheme and Yung-Cheng Lee's. Lee's scheme needs 1 × T h in registration phase, and 7 × T h in login and verification phases. Our scheme needs 4 × T h in registration phase and 12 × T h in login and mutual authentication phases. Clearly, proposed scheme needs more computational amount than Yung-Cheng Lee's scheme. However, those costs are necessary to protect user's anonymity and provide session-key for partners. In short, Additional computational cost is essential to enhance security.
Due to the fact that our scheme and Lee's are based on smart-card, we compare the storage capacity of smart-card. To do that, we assume that output hash function is 160 bit long, for example SHA-I. Furthermore, we also would like to consider communication cost between user and server in term of authentication in two schemes. In table 2, we see that smart-card of our schemes contains 160 bits longer than one in Lee's scheme. Besides, in authentication phase, our scheme also needs more twice bits than Lee's scheme. However, these costs increase security for scheme. In withstanding various attacks. We see that his scheme cannot resist to impersonation and smart-card-theft attacks. In addition, their scheme does not provide mutual authentication and session-key agreement. It can be seen that our proposed scheme is more secure against various attacks. 
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Conclusions
In this paper, we review a new dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme to resist smart-card-theft attack of Yung-Cheng Lee. Although his scheme can withstand some attacks, such as password guessing. Nevertheless, we see that his scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation and smart-card-theft attacks. Morever, his scheme cannot provide mutual authentication and session-key agreement. Consequently, we propose an improved scheme to eliminate such problems.
